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PUTTING WOMEN FIRST
Mary Coombs*
GENDER, CruME, AND PUNISHMENT. By Kathleen Daly. New
Haven: Yale University Press. 1994. Pp. xi, 338. $37.50.

Mattie Lou Thomas was the sole support and caretaker for two
mentally disabled adult children and the guardian and caretaker for
her four-year-old grandchild. When a U.S. district court judge sentenced her for possession of four kilos of heroin, he thought he
should take these family responsibilities into account: As a result,
he sentenced her to probation rather than the six years that the
prosecution had recommended per 21 U.S.C. § 84l(b) 1 and that the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines seemed to call for. 2 The Seventh
Circuit reversed. 3 The Guidelines, it held, did not permit judges to
impose probation rather than incarceration on the basis of even extraordinary family responsibilities.4 Although other courts have rejected the Seventh Circuit's position that family responsibilities
never justify a downward departure from incarceration to probation,5 all have recognized that the Guidelines at least narrowly constrain judges' discretion to take such factors into account.6
According to the Guidelines, "Family ties and responsibilities . . .

* Professor of Law, University of Miami. B.A. 1965, J.D. 1978, University of Michigan.
- Ed. The comments of Patrick Gudridge, Kathleen Daly, Jonathan Simon, and Tony Al·
fieri are much appreciated; any remaining errors are the result of my foolish rejection of their
wise advice.
1. 21 u.s.c. § 84l{b) {1988).
2. United States Sentencing Commission, Guideline Manual, § 2Dl.1 (Nov. 1994) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
3. United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 526 {7th Cir.), cert denied, 502 U.S. 857 (1991).
4. Thomas, 930 F.2d at 528.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992). Ms. Johnson was the
sole support and caretaker for four young children. The Second Circuit affirmed a substantial downward departure from the Guideline sentence for conspiracy and bribery to a sentence that would not take her from the home. It rejected the argument "that family
circumstances warranting departure must include something beyond extraordinary parental
responsibilities." Johnson, 964 F.2d at 129.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Mogel, 956 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Brewer, 899 F.2d 503 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 844 (1990) (both denying departure);
see Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women, and Other Sex·
Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L.
REv. 905 (1993); Karen R. Smith, Note, U.S. v. Johnson: The Second Circuit Overcomes the
Sentencing Guidelines' Myopic View of "Not Ordinarily Relevant" Family Responsibilities of
the Criminal Offender, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 573 {1993).
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are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence
should be outside the applicable guideline range."7
The Guidelines - like much of criminal law, criminal law policy
analyses, and academic criminology - seem to have been designed
around a paradigm of the criminal as male.s The Commissioners
who drafted the Guidelines thought that including family responsibilities as a factor in sentencing would advantage largely white
middle-class criminals, who could present themselves as responsible
and loving husbands and fathers, to the relative disadvantage of
lower-class, minority federal felons. 9 They apparently did not consider the impact of the rule on female' federal felons and the singleparent families disrupted by their loss. 10
Traditional criminology has followed a similar pattem.11 Criminologists study criminal men, though they rarely discuss the maleness of the criminal population.12 Studies of women criminals have
been marginalized and ghettoized.13 Even as feminist concerns and
methodologies have become part of the normal discourse of law
and of other aspects of sociology, criminology "remains essentially
7. U.S.S.G. § 5Hl.6.
8. This is not literally true; the enacting legislation indicates that the Guidelines are to be
"entirely neutral" as to sex, race, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic factors. 28
u.s.c. § 994(d) (1988).
9. See Myrna S. Raeder, Gender Issues in the Federal Sentencing , Guidelines and
Mandatory Minimum Sentences, CRIM. Jusr., Fall 1993, at 20, 21.
10. One of the original Commissioners has said that there was extensive debate over the
appropriate relevance of offender characteristics, with some Commissioners arguing that considerations such as family ties should be treated as mitigating factors. The Commission decided to follow the criteria of the Parole Commission, which do not consider most offender
characteristics. They concluded that "[qongress suggested that the Commission should, but
was not required to, consider" these factors, citing § 994( d). Stephen Breyer, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HoFSTRA L. REv.
1, 20 (1988).
11. By criminology, I refer to the study of both the etiology of crime and of the activities
of the criminal justice system.
12. See, e.g., REsEARCH oN SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM (Alfred Blumstein
et al. eds., 1983) (containing, within a two volume work, extensive analysis of sentencing and
race but only two pages examining sentencing and sex). Those criminologists - largely feminists - who have noted the correlation between sex and criminality and the failure of traditional criminology to focus upon it, let alone explain it, refer to the correlation as the "gender
ratio problem." Kathleen Daly & Meda Chesney-Lind, Feminism and Criminology, 5 Ju5T.
Q. 497' 508 (1988).
In this review, I focus predominantly upon the issues of gender and criminology that Daly
raises in her book. The book itself though its title and structure deal with gender, also looks
deeply and critically at the effects of race and, to a lesser extent, class, and the interactions
among these variables in its substantive analysis of crime and sentencing.
13. Although studies of women criminals exist, they have tended either to provide explanations that are gender-specific, such as Lombroso's physiological theories of female criminology, CEsARE LoMBRoso, THE FEMALE OFFENDER (1915), or to attribute increased
female crime to women becoming more like men, FREDA ADLER, S1srERS IN CRIME (1975)
(suggesting links between women's liberation and the increase in the rate of crime among
women); RrrA JAMES SIMON, WOMEN AND CRIME (1975) (same).
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untouched." 14 Yet gender is the most accurate single predictor of
criminal record,15 and prisons are perhaps the most gendersegregated American institutions.16
Kathleen Daly's17 new book, Gender, Crime, and Punishment,
promises to make a major contribution to the de-masculinization of
criminology. There have been other excellent and insightful feminist studies of both criminals and the criminal justice system in recent years.1s Daly, however, applies her feminist insights to the
analysis of the criminal justice system and its responses to both
male and female or, perhaps more accurately, to both female and
male criminals. The book puts women first and then uses the insights thus obtained in its parallel analysis of men.
In this review, I want to focus on and explore the implications of
Daly's insights about the relationship between gender and sentencing. Statistics in previous studies indicate that judges treat women
defendants more leniently at sentencing;19 the authors of those
studies set out a variety of theses to explain the apparent differences. Women, or at least some women, they suggest, are treated
with chivalry and thus given lesser sentences than similarly situated
men.2 0 Women are also generally seen as embedded in familial relationships that provide informal social controls and thus as less in
need of the formal social controls of the criminal justice system.
14. Daly & Chesney-Lind, supra note 12, at 498.
15. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF lNVESTIGATION, 1993 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 217, 234
{1994); see also Judith Allen, Men, Crime and Criminology: Recasting the Questions, 11 INTL.
J. Soc. L 19, 19 (1989).
16. Cf. Klinger v. Nebraska Dept. of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727 {8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting a
challenge to a lack of programs and facilities for women inmates at a women's prison on the
ground that the different characteristics of women and men inmates mean that they are not
similarly situated for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause). See generally Nico LE HAHN
RAFTER, p ARTIAL JUSTICE: WoMEN,' PRISONS, AND SOCIAL CONTROL {2d ed. 1990) (studying women's prisons).
17. Kathleen Daly is a Visiting Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of
Michigan.
18. See, e.g., PAT CARLEN, WOMEN'S IMPRISONMENT: A STUDY IN SOCIAL CONTROL
(1983); ELEANOR M. MILLER, STREET WOMAN (1986); Mary E. Gilfus, From Victims to Survivors to Offenders: Women's Routes of Entry and Immersion into Street Crimes, 4 WOMEN &
CRIM. JUST. 63 (1992).
19. See Nicolette Parisi, Are Females Treated Differently? A Review of the Theories and
Evidence on Sentencing and Parole Decisions, in JUDGE, LAWYER, V1cnM, TmEF 205 (Nicole
Hahn Rafter & Elizabeth Anne Stanko eds., 1982); Darrell J. Steffensmeier, Assessing the
Impact of the Women's Movement on Sex-Based Differences in the Handling of Adult Criminal Defendants, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 344 (1980).
20. See CARLEN, supra note 18, at 63; Kathleen Daly, Rethinking Judicial Paternalism:
Gender, Work-family Relations, and Sentencing, 3 GENDER & SoCY. 9, 17 (1989) [hereinafter
Daly, Rethinking Judicial Paternalism].
Girls are expected to live within the confines of a strictly delineated social role. They are
thus more harshly treated than similarly situated boys when they deviate from those roles.
See Meda Chesney-Lind, Girl's Crime and Woman's Place: Toward a Feminist Model of Female Delinquency, 35 CRIME & DELINQ. 5 (1989); Parisi, supra note 19.
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Daly's narratives indicate that life is not so simple. Apparent gender disparities almost all evaporate when one examines the richer
data of the narratives. Men and women are sentenced differently.
Those differences in sentencing, however, seem to reflect differences between the crimes committed. A man kills an intimate as an
expression of rage or jealousy. A woman kills an intimate to protect herself from potential future abuse. These differences in criminal activity may be real, or they may be characteristics that
probation officers and judges recognize more readily in the women
defendants because they, like the rest of us, expect to see certain
characteristics in women but not in men. What is clear is that the
differences are not the reflection of gender as such; rather, they are

gendered.
As Daly suggests and as I explore here, once we see the
gendered nature of sentencing differences, our normative response
becomes complicated. Women should not receive leniency simply
because they are women. They should receive leniency, however,
for legitimate differences. Statistical evidence that woinen do receive lower sentences may be either the legitimate effect of real
gender differences or the less legitimate effect of gendered preconceptions. It is difficult at best to disentangle these forces. Are the
differences in punishment between men and women attributable to
something essentially distinctive about men and women? To actual
though socially created differences? To different treatment of
women and men who are relevantly similau? The. justice of taking
difference into account turns, we become aware, on whether differences are real or perceptual, natural or constructed. Y~t none of
our methodological tools allows us to deterinine with certainty
which characterization is correct.
Daly's innovation of first studying women's crimes and
sentences and then men's, though it does not directly answer these
questions, helps us to move beyond the approach of prior statistical
studies, which had judged gender disparities against simplistic
norms rooted in notions of formal gender equality. Through Daly's
analysis, we can see the gendered nature of both crime and punishment and begin to examine the implications of those practices for
achieving justice.
The Daly book has two significant, and interrelated, innovations. In addition to the substantive, gendered approach described
above, the book embodies a new. methodological approach. ·Daly
consciously uses both statistical, logico-scientific methods and narrative methods in her study. She provides an argument and, more
importantly, an illustration of how we can develop and test knowl-
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edge most productively by an oscillation between the two methodologies, sensitive to the benefits and inadequacies of each.21
In the remainder of this review, I first briefly summarize the
structure of the book. I then examine and assess the validity and
significance of Daly's findings. Finally, I consider the possible implications for both scholarship and public policy if we apply Daly's
methodology and the insights of her findings.

I. THE BOOK - A SUMMARY
Daly bases her book on data from her study of sentencing patterns in the New Haven, Connecticut felony court between 19811986. Her statistical base is a wide sample of all women, 163, and a
random sample of men, 154, convicted during the time period (pp.
26-27 tbl. 2.1). Her narrative materials use a matched deep sample
of forty women ~d forty men, selected from the wide sample
cases.22 She compares sentences for defendants across gender lines,
examining both the percentages of men and women in various categories who received a sentence of incarceration - the "in-out decision" - and sentence length. In addition to analyzing the actual
sentences received, Daly uses the transcripts of the sentencing colloquies to examine the process of sentencing and the judge's rationale for the sentence imposed.2 3 Her narratives for the eighty deep
sample cases depend primarily on the presentence investigative report (PSI) prepared for each defendant and, to a lesser extent, on
these colloquies.24
After a brief discussion of her research questions and methodology and a summary of the statistical profile of her wide sample,
Daly provides information on the backgrounds of her deep sample
felons. Her data allow the reader to compare the male and female
felons in her samples on such characteristics as race stresses in family of origin (for example, single parent, financial difficulties, abuse
or neglect) educational achievement, substance abuse, job status,
and current family status.25 Both groups had troubled backgrounds
and current stresses, but significant differences between the genders
21. See infra text accompanying notes 31-37.
22. She matches the deep sample cases first by statutory charge at arraignment and con·
viction and then, as much as possible, by the following criteria in this order: prior record,
age, race, and pretrial release status. Pp. 22-23.
23. P. vii. Unfortunately, only 48 of the 80 sentencing colloquies were available for analysis because the stenographer for the remainder, who had used a form of shorthand no one
could read and translate, was unavailable. Pp. 283-84.
24. All but one of the cases was plea bargained, and the bargains frequently included an
agreement relating to sentence. P. 23. Because the PSI was not generally prepared until
after the plea agreement, the information therein can be correlated with sentence but not
linked causally. P. 21.
25. See, e.g., p. 58 tbl. 3.2 (describing the racial breakdown of women among various
pathways).
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are also apparent. According to the PSI reports, more of the
women suffered abuse as children or ran away from home or a detention facility. More women suffered from substance addictions,
or psychological problems, or both, but fewer P.ad significant prior
criminal records (pp. 43-45, 63-65). The statistically most striking
difference was that two-thirds of the women said they had children,
and one-third said that they were currently caring for a child; only
just over a third of the men said they were fathers, and none bore
current responsibility for a child (pp. 44, 64).
Using PSI.reports as the ciata SOU]:ce_pn the defendant's characteristics presents a complex problem, however. There may in fact
be such a striking difference in parenting rates among male and female felons, or the data may instead reflect a difference in questions asked or answers given. If, for example, probation officers
considered parenthood status more important in developing an accurate picture of female defendants, they might be more sure to ask
about it. Conversely, men might, as Daly notes, be inclined to hide
their parenthood status from authority figures if.they were not paying support (p. 81 n.3). Such data problems may be even more intractable for factors more difficult or delicate to determine, such as
patterns of sexual abuse.
Daly also provides, with considerable depth and subtlety, a
richer description of the biographies of her deep sample felons. She
divides the women into five typologies. Most common are "street
women" and "harmed and harming women," who together comprise twenty-five out of the group of forty women sampled. Other
"pathways to felony court" include "battered women," "drugconnected women," and a residual "other" (pp. 47-48 tbl. 3.1).
Daly then uses these typologies, together with the PSI data, to construct pathways for the male felons, including "street men" and
"harmed and harming men" who together comprise twenty-three of
the group of men sampled, as well as "drug-connected men" and
"costs and excesses of masculinity." Sh~ subdivides this last category into "explosively violent men," "bad luck men," and "masculine gaming" (pp. 67-68 tbl. 4.1). In her development of categories,
Daly continually takes into account the patterning of race and class
and the similarities and differences across these various demographic divides. Interestingly, the "harmed and harming" category
acknowledges the ways in which abuse and neglect suffered when
the defendants were younger is recognizably reproduced in the aggressive behavior of both male and female felons. In contrast, "battered women" have no parallel in the male biographies. Rather,
they may be matched to the explosively violent men, whose violence, often while drunk, is most frequently directed toward intimates and family members (pp. 74-76).

1692

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 93:1686

The heart of the book consists of a series of chapters organized
by type of crime. In each chapter - robbery (pp. 93-110), larceny
(pp. 111-23), interpersonal violence (pp. 124-50), and drug offenses
(pp. 151-63) - Daly begins by setting out the statistical patterns of
sentencing. These patterns consistently indicate what appears to be
greater leniency toward female felons. 2 6 She then does pair-wise
comparisons of her deep sample felons, creating narratives of their
crimes and biographies based on the PSI and sentencing data. The
more closely she examines the material, the more the gender differences become explicable; she ultimately concludes that only one of
the forty pairs presents a difference in sentencing that cannot be
explained by differences in the crimes or the biographies of the
criminals.27
Daly next examines the question of justifications for punishment. She finds that the New Haven judges, like the federal judges
studied by Wheeler, Mann, and Sarat,28 tend to apply a rather pragmatic blend of the various justifications for punishment set out in
the academic literature. She discerns relatively little difference between the judges' sentencing processes or the justifications they
provide in the cases of male and female felons. 2 9 This is perhaps
the least satisfactory part of the book. The sentencing colloquies
are generally short, and almost all are constrained by the preceding
plea bargain. Daly notes that she had to read over the colloquies
several times before a pattern began to emerge (p. 183). Even in
the excerpts she provides, the language reflecting deterrence or retribution seems too fragmentary to serve as a framework for much
analysis. Wheeler and his coauthors developed a much richer picture of judges' sentencing by interviewing judges. Although it
would be desirable to know what judges do, as well as what they say
they do, the transcripts, as presented here, seem too formal and
26. If one compares the most general statistics - the in-out decision and sentence length
- across gender for the wide sample and for the deep sample for each of the four crime
types, there are sixteen different comparison points, for example, wide sample robbery in-out
or deep sample interpersonal violence sentence length. The sentence severity is significantly
higher for women for two of those sixteen comparisons and approximately the same for two
others; in all the rest men fare worse. P. 94 tbl. 5.1; p. 112 tbl. 6.1; p. 127 tbl. 7.1; p. 153 tbl.
8.1.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 39-45 for a more detailed discussion of some of the
comparisons. Daly herself recognizes that the differences in crime or biography that "explain" the sentencing differences are themselves frequently associated with gender in our
society and may reflect gendered preconceptions about these felons. Pp. 260-62.
28. STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITIING IN JUDGMENT (1988). Wheeler and his coauthors discovered that federal judges sentence based on a mix of three principles: the harm
caused; the defendant's blameworthiness; and the consequences for the defendant, his immediate circle, and the broader public of the sentence imposed. Id. at 19-22.
29. There was some difference in the process by which the sentencing hearing occurred.
For example, judges were silent in 35% of the men's sentencing colloquies but only 14% of
the women's. P. 203. The significance of such processual differences is unclear.
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ceremonial to inform us well about· the process by which the judges
made their sentencing decisions.30
Daly concludes the book with a brief discussion of the problem
of justice. She suggests that justice has multiple aspects and reminds us, first, that discrimination is only one aspect of injustice.
For example, a death sentence for every felon would be unjust,
though not, on its face, discriminatory. She also problematizes the
notion of discrimination. If women and men have different biographies and play different roles in committing different crimes,
though they are charged with violating the same statute, how can
we determine what gendered pattern of sentences is just?
II.

ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE

Daly's work makes contributions on two levels. First, she furthers our substantive understanding of criminological issues, in part
by using feminist concerns as a lens for examining the criminal
pathways and judicial responses of male criminals. Second, in a
methodological parallel, she uses narrative - often associated with
feminist scholarship31 - to enlarge the otherwise too-limited understandings available from traditional logico-scientific methodologies.32 She does not reject the latter as wrong, as some more radical
30. Daly also operated under a structural disadvantage compared to Wheeler and his
colleagues, who studied pre-Guideline federal ·sentencing practices. In those white-collar
cases, judges had much smaller case loads and more time to consider and articulate sentencing theories, and private defense attorneys likely had more time to devote to the sentencing
process. See COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE CoURTS, STATE
CoURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNuAL REPORT 1990, at 42 tbl. I.17 (1992) (federal district
courts' criminal filings were 85 per judge together with 379 civil cases in 1990; for state courts'
criminal filings were 474 per judge with 667 civil cases).
Such formalized rituals of justice are, of course, a rich source for other forms of sociolegal studies. Cf., e.g., CuFFoRD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION oF CULTURES (1973) (using
thick description to unpack the socio-cultural meanings of Balinese rituals); GREGORY M.
MATOESIAN, REPRODUCING RAPE: DOMINATION THROUGH TALK IN 1liE CoURTROOM
(1993) (using socio-linguistics to analyze the violence inherent in patterns of discourse during
rape trials). I suggest only that the transcripts do not provide a very clear window into a
judge's reasoning about sentencing choices.
31. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 19 CAL. L. REv. 971 (1991);
Mary I. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 CoLO. L. REv. 683
(1992).
'
32. Daly's book is also unusual in another way. In contrast to the magisterial, abstract
tone of most academic literature, Daly frequently makes herself vividly present in her book.
In discussing one man's sentencing, she said, "I wondered why no court official offered a
negative word to Wade." P. 204. She summarized the results of two other cases and continued, "I wavered between· seeing the outcome as a different response and seeing it as a disparate response." P. 246. Finally, in commenting on a prior study of crime in New Haven, she
concluded, "As a sociologist, I was troubled by the implications of Finnegan's journalistic
method." P. 17. Her rejection of passive-voiced certitude is of a piece with her including as
appendices generous excerpts of the materials from which she worked. Both allow the
reader to engage the materials and the author actively and creatively.
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feminist critics have done.33 Nor does she suggest, in a methodological parallel to the "add-women-and-stir" substantive response
to feminist critique, that one can simply "add narrative and stir" to
obtain a coherent unified methodology. Rather, and much more
usefully, she proposes that neither logico-positivism nor narrative
provide a complete understanding of any interesting problem.
Each answers to an internal, but somewhat distinct, logic. Logicopositive analysis focuses on abstract and universal truth conditions;
narrative focuses on context and particularity. Each, as Daly acknowledges throughout the book, can reveal the limits of the other.
Rather than concluding that either approach is so inherently inadequate that we should abandon it, however,34 she pragmatically uses
both approaches to develop a better, though still imperfect, picture
of the world than either alone could provide. Social science scholarship, she proposes, proceeds best through an oscillation between
these two useful, but not wholly compatible, modes: "The work of
oscillation means a commitment to a nonadversarial, nonhierarchical stance about the superiority of logico-science or narrative
"35

This book demonstrates the value of such an oscillation ap-.
proach. Repeatedly, Daly presents a statistical picture that raises
questions about the impact of gender and then uses specific narratives to provide at least tentative answers to such questions. Those
answers, in tum, raise further questions, particularly about the role
of notions of justice as a means of assessing what courts do in sentencing men and women.36 A first approach to these questions
might call for the larger sample size and the more formalized and
abstract approach of logico-science;37 the insights thus developed
33. See, e.g., Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE
LJ. 1373 (1986); cf. SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE? THINKING
FROM WOMEN'S LIVES 143-49 (1991) (rejecting the value-free objectivity generally associated
with logico-science).
34. Cf. Keith Hawkins, On Legal Decision-Making, 43 WASH. & LEE L. RBv.1161, 1181
(1986). Hawkins criticizes logico-scientists as seeking "to portray the jungle of human decision-making by removing all the undergrowth, scrub and saplings, leaving a broad landscape
over which are dotted a number of large and important trees." Id. Daly would, I think, agree
but point out that it is equally impossible wholly to understand a jungle through a thorough
and deep understanding of a few particular leaves and roots.
35. P. 264. She refers to this stance as oscillation; one might use the more materialist
metaphor of building a bridge between two camps. That bridge, or collection of fragile and
swaying bridges, may provide a way to avoid, if not solve, the dead end of epistemological
doubt.
36. For narrative scholars, "An evaluation of justice system practices is bracketed." P.
267. Cf. CARI.EN, supra note 18, at 2 ("[T]he case-study method can, at its best, provoke
questions which go beyond the particular case to a theoretical consideration of wider
issues.").
37. Justice norms rooted in concepts of discrimination and disparity would seem to require, at least at some stage of the analysis, a consideration of what was done across a large
number of cases, even if that consideration necessarily entails a simplified set of criteria. Cf.
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would likely raise questions that would send us back to narrative to
understand how concepts of justice are applied to concrete cases.
Daly persuaded me that this oscillation between logico-science and
narrative was highly useful, less by her theoretical argument than
by the example of the use of the oscillation methodology throughout the book, which may reveal my tilt toward the concreteness of
narrative.
The achievements of the oscillation approach are most evident
in the book's analysis of the use of gender in punishment. Daly
uses the pathways to criminal court and pair-wise crime narratives
to develop a multi-leveled construction of gender in punishment.
She also examines the effects of race and class. Next, she scrutinizes the rationales for sentencing. Then she examines the subtle
bias of gender in role perceptions between criminals and victims.
Finally, Daly looks at other factors in the sentencing process. Ultimately, she offers no particular solution, but .she highlights issues in
the current debate.
While Daly's other observations on criminal behavior will help
further studies on the gendered etiology of crime, I introduce such
material only to examine the construction of gender within the punishment process. Daly bases both the description of pathways to
criminal court and the pair-wise crime narratives predominantly on
the presentence investigations. This data, as she reminds us, is
likely to be partial in ways that reflect gendered as~umptions both
by the probation officers in asking questions and by the defendants
in revealing it. For example, though the data appear to indicate
that more women have histories of abuse, they may reflect instead,
or in part, that women more often and effectively articulate such
histories38 or that probation officers are more likely to probe for
such information when dealing with female defendants (pp. 83-84).
Furthermore, women's experiences of the "same" abuse may b~ different or may differentially affect their choice to engage in criminal
behavior. These issues of the truth and relevance of gendered difRichard J. Light & David B. Pillemer, Numbers and Na"ative: Combining Their Strengths in
Research Reviews, 52 HARv. Eouc. REv. 1, 18 (1982) (suggesting that formal procedures are
generally better than informal intuitions at detecting subtle but significant effects of different
treatment modalities, but that explanations of these differences require a qualitative, contextualized study).
38. This is not to say that the women who come into criminal court readily articulate their
biographies in ways consonant with the expectations of legal professionals. See, e.g., Lucie E.
White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of
Mrs. G., 38 BUF.F. L. REv. 1 (1990). I suggest only that women felons, on average, may do so
better than their male counterparts. This would be consistent with suggestions in the literature that women are more likely to speak in the language of care, perhaps because it is the
more useful and natural language for those who are disempowered. See generally Isabel
Marcus et al., Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law - A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L.
REV. 11 (1985).
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ferences are central to what the book reveals yet simultaneously
and inevitably problematize much of the book's argument.
Two particular comparisons - Casey and Toni, and Andrew
and Latasha - illustrate the multiple levels at which gender operates.39 Casey, a black man whose story opens the book, struck a
female store clerk in the head with a blunt instrument and then
took money from the cash register.. Toni, a white woman, demanded money from a female jewelry store clerk at gunpoint but
left in frustration when the clerk refused, Casey was sentenced to
ten years; Toni received three years probation (pp. 3-4, 96-97).
Daly says that the difference, though it might appear to raise a
question of gender discrimination,4 o is explicable on closer examination. The substantial difference in prior records and the existence of victim injury in only Casey's case provide two genderneutral reasons for the differential in sentencing. But Daly also
says that Casey's act was "far more serious" (p. 96), not just because of the injury but because of "the greater threat he posed to
[the female clerk] than did Toni ..." (p. 97). "Toni posed little
threat ... the clerk did not believe she would shoot, because, as the
clerk reported, Toni 'didn't look like the type of person' to commit
a robbery" (p. 97). Was Toni really less dangerous? Or just perceived as less dangerous? Perceived as less dangerous because she
was a young white female? If the jewelry store clerk was less afraid
of Toni than she would, have been of a black man like Casey who
acted in exactly the same way, is this a valid reason for punishing
Toni less?41 Daly suggests that Toni was only an amateur and not
really dangerous, but the materials she presents do not persuade me
that the clerk was necessarily right in· discounting the risk Toni
created.
·
In the comparison of Andre"'.' and Latasha, Daly is much more
critical of the gender presumptions underlying their different
sentences. Andrew and Latasha each assaulted police officers;
Latasha had a prior record, and Andrew did not. Andrew received
four years; Latasha received- a suspended sentence and $1,000 restitution (p. 136). In the struggle with Andrew and his companion,
the officers suffered abrasions and contusions, a damaged ear, and
broken teeth (p. 136). The injuries inflicted by Latasha were not
39. Note that while Andrew and Latasha are a matched deep sample pair, Casey and
Toni are not. Daly discusses their cases together, however, because they look similar in regard to such facts as acting alone, robbing a commercial establishment, and using a weapon.
P. 96.
40. Daly ~istinguishes between discrimination - the correlation of a characteristic like
race or sex with sentencing after controlling for relevant variables - and disparity, inconsistency in.sentencing relative to agreed-upon criteria. Pp. 237-38.
41. On the corrosive impact on African-American men of being perceived as dangerous,
see, for example, Stephen L. Caner, When Victims Happen To Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420
(1988).
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detailed, but she struck two officers with a baseball bat, one across
the nose (p. 136). The different sentences appear to be based on· a
highly gendered construction of Latasha's actions. The court discounted her crime by constructing her as "acting crazy" and "in
need of psychiatric help" (p. 250). That narrative fits historic patterns of defining women as crazy rather than deliberately bad;42 it
also reduces police embarrassment at being unable to prevent an
attack by a woman (p. 250).
The Andrew-Latasha pair is the single one of her forty matched
pairs in which Daly could find no nongendered explanation for the
discrimination. In general~ she found that close examination of the
narratives explained what appeared to be gender disparities in sentencing.43 If Daly's narrative analysis is correct, prior studies emphasizing the gender disparity in sentencing are wrong: there is no
significant gender disparity in sentencing in need of explanation.
Men generally received higher sentences, but the men's cases were
generally more serious.44 Among the interp·ersonal violence cases,
for example, Daly found only one pair in which the woman's crime
was more serious, and seven pairs in which the man's was (p. 145).
In reaching those conclusions, however, she occasionally seemed to
accept as legitimate the judges' use of such gendered factors as the
criminal's perceived role in the crime or prior relationship with the
victim.45
·
Some factors other than gender seem to have independent explanatory power, even in the·context of the rich complexity of the
narratives. Race and class each· appear to correlate strongly with
adjudged criminality - both the wide and deep samples have many
more poor people and people of color than a tandom sample of the
New Haven population.46 Most interesting for this essay is the sig42. Cf. Hilary Allen, Rendering· Them Harmless: The Professional Portrayal of Women
Charged With Serious Violent Crimes, in GENDER, CRIME AND JUSTICE 81, 88 (Pat Carlen &
Anne Worrall eds., 1987) (suggesting that a woman's status as wife and mother seems "fundamentally incompatible with the perception of her as a dangerous criminal"); Susan Stefan,
The Protection Racket: Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric Labeling, and Law, 88 Nw. U._L.
REV. 1271, 1312-13 (1994) (discussing how women victims are constructed as crazy).
43. See also Darrell J. Steffensmeier et al., Gender and Imprisonment Decisions, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 411, 416 (1993) ("[F]emale offenders tend to conimit the less serious form of crime
within the broad offense categories.").
44. Pp. 240-41. Other researchers have similarly concluded that much of the apparent
gender discrimination in sentencing evaporates on closer examination. See, e.g., Elizabeth
Rapaport, The Death Penalty <ind Gender Discrimination, 25 L. & SoCY.. REv: 367 (1991);
Steffensmeier, supra note 19.
•
45. See infra text accompanying notes 52-54.
46. Daly's study thus confirms Miller's claims that women's criminality, like men's, takes
place primarily among the least advantaged. It is not a result of feminist gains and new
ambitions; it is the result of economic disadvantage. See Mn.I.ER, supra note 18, at 5. Because Daly does not focus on the race- or class-linked nature of other factors, it is impossible
to tell to what extent race or class in and of themselves explain sentencing patterns. Compare
p. 16 with p. 26 tbl. I.
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nificance of the race-gender intersection. The statistical data generally indicate that both race and gender affected sentencing. After
looking at the more qualitative narrative data, Daly suggests that
the effect is interactional: African-American men are at the top of
the punishment hierarchy.4 7 "Their biographies were least likely to
be constructed with the blurred boundaries theme of victimization
and criminalization, they were most likely to be categorized as troublemakers or committed to street life, and they were least likely
seen as reformable" (p. 263; emphasis added). Note again the impossibility, on the information available to Daly or the reader, of
disentangling the effect of real differences, relevant to the justifications for punishment, and of perceptions of difference colored by
race and gender.
In addition to examining and assessing the gendered differences
in sentencing, Daly examines the rationales provided for sentencing. She then attempts to assess the sentences imposed for internal
consistency and for coherence with broader notions of just sentencing. She recognizes that there are numerous possible sources for
such criteria. One could assess the sentences against any of a
number of rationales for punishment set forth by various academic
philosophers of sentencing. Classically, these rationales have included retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, reformation, and various combinations thereof.48 Daly largely eschews such an external
critique. Rather, she accepts as her basis for judgment the criteria
that judges apply or claim to be applying - harm, blameworthiness, and consequences (p. 173). Although at this level of abstraction the state judges' concerns parallel those of federal judges
sentencing white collar criminals,4 9 the concrete applications are
often quite distinct. By examining the sentences as well as the reasons provided, Daly constructs a list of particular factors that appear to influence sentencing. Sentences, she notes, were less severe
when the defendant had a less substantial prior record, led a more
conventional life, and when the crime could be linked to a contemporary or prior victimization of the defendant. All these factors influenced the assessment of blameworthiness and reformability; all
are at least correlated with gender (p. 227).
47. P. 235-36. Her data show that the judges viewed only 3 of 18 black men as reformable
or not dangerous. compared to 4 of 5 white men. P. 224. This conclusion differs from that of
Steffensmeier and his coauthors who studied a large sample of sentences in Pennsylvania and
found that judges treated black and white men relatively similarly, but that they gave black
women harsher sentences than white women. Steffensmeier et al., supra note 43, at 430.
48. See, e.g., P. 171 tbl. IV.1; JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT
(1830); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSWIUTY (1968); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCilON (1968).
49. See WHEELER ET AL., supra note 28.
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The narratives suggest that gender simpliciter is not a good predictor of sentencing. Thus there is no empirical basis for the thesis
that judges are engaging in chivalry and being lenient with women
simply because they are women. Nonetheless, factors that correlate
with gender do appear to explain much of sentencing.so Although
the factors she highlights, such as differences in the seriousness of
the particular crime,51 or the extent of prior victimization provide
an explanation, they are not necessarily the only or the best
explanation.
·
In reading through the book, I saw simple gender prejudice potentially at work more often than Daly herself, perhaps because I
became suspicious of its invisible workings within a system in which
it occasionally surfaced quite openly. I also am more explicitly concerned with the effects on the justice system and on feminist goals
when the courts take into account gendered, though arguably legitimate, factors. Consider, for example, the judicial responses to Edie
and George, which Daly highlights, as evidence of gendered images
of defendants. Edie killed her stepmother, a woman with
Alzheimer's disease for whom she was the overburdened primary
caretaker. The judge gave her a long sentence because he viewed
Edie as "a serious threat to other persons," given her statement in a
psychiatric evaluation that "I murdered the wrong person . . . I
should have killed my husband" (p. 138). The sentencing judge discounted future dangerousness, however, in the case of George, who
had fired a gun at his wife and daughter. G~orge said, "My daughter, she got nothing else against me. She's.not mad at me because I
did that"; this somehow showed that he was no longer a threat to
anyone (p. 221). My instincts, like Daly's, are that these episodes
reflect illegitimate gender stereotypes of a woman's crazy danger50. Daly is sensitive to the limits of such a narrative. As she asks, "At what point do we
register a sense that, although one offense was more serious than another, the penalty difference seems too large?" P. 247. I stress this point in the text, not because Daly is unaware of
it, but because it is so central to both the weaknesses and, in a deeper sense, the strengths of
her work.
51. Even the seriousness-of-crime factor - a major determinant of sentence severity in
both Guideline and non-Guideline jurisdictions - may not be gender-free. The idea of what
"larceny" or "drug possession" means is generally built around an image of a typically male
crime and might look different if we thought about the context and motive of a female lawbreaker. One may contrast the invisibility of women here with the law's over-sensitivity to
race; the law views crimes seen as typically black, such as the sale and use of crack, as more
serious than perhaps quite similar crimes committed by whites, such as the sale and use of
powder cocaine. See Knoll D. Lowney, Smoked Not Snoned: ls Racism Inherent In Our
Crack Cocaine Laws?, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 121 (1994); cf. U.S. Sentencing
Commission: Materials Concerning Sentencing for Crack Cocaine Offenses, 57 Crim. L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 9, at 2127 (May 31, 1995) (statement of the majority of the Sentencing Commission recognizing the disproportionate effect of the 100-1 powder-crack ratio on AfricanAmericans and recommending amendments to Guideline § 2Dl.1 to eliminate the ratio).
But cf. United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the argument that
U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.1 evinced unconscious racism and violated the Equal Protection Clause).
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ousness and a middle class man's aberrational behavior brought
about by marital troubles. Yet the different outcomes are also
wholly explicable by the harm of killing versus that of assault without injuries. These specific examples of fairly blatant gender
stereotyping raise for me a concern about pervasive though unarticulated gender biases.
One can see a similar mix of factors, making definitive conclusions impossible, in the comparison of Charles and Bell (pp. 10406). Each had committed a robbery; she was sentenced to four
months plus restitution; he received a suspended sentence and a
$1,000 fine. She had eight prior convictions; he had none. Her accomplice hit the victim hard enough to send him to the hospital; he
used a handgun to take his victim's purse but did not hit her. She
obtained $825; he got a purse containing $10 and a checkbook.
While these factors might suggest that Bell deserved greater punishment, Bell's victim, who knew Bell, did not report the crime immediately and seemed unconcerned that she might seek revenge; in
contrast, Charles's victim said that she had been more fearful since
the incident. Daly "judged Charles's offenses as being more serious" (p. 106). I am inclined to disagree. The richer context of the
narratives frequently allows for such disagreement, depending on
one's weighing and measuring of various factors. With the narratives, one can problematize, but not resolve, the apparent gender
discrimination of the statistical data. In theory, but probably not
practicably, one could incorporate more of these factors into a large
enough data set to provide statistically valid conclusions. Even theoretically, this is insufficient, however, for, as Daly stresses, what
one learns from the narratives is a gestalt of the crime, not simply a
longer list of potentially relevant factors that could be accounted
for by a more refined logico-scientific analysis.
Thus, one frequently can provide an explanation other than gender, but one cannot be sure of the extent to which gender itself still
played a role, directly or by coloring one's perception of the existence or significance of the alternative explanations for the seriousness of the crime. At the beginning of her discussion of the crimes
committed by the men and women in her sample, Daly provides
another list of factors that have been used in prior literature as indicia of the seriousness of the offense: "the degree of the injury, the
value of the property taken, the presence of weapons, the defendant's role in the offense, and victim-offender relations" (p. 90). At
least two of these readily suggest a gendered view.
All things being equal, the judge will treat a defendant with less
severity if her role in the offense is minor. As Daly notes, when a
group commits a crime, it is usually an all-male or a mixed-gender
group; few of her women felons acted with other women. Our
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gendered images lead us to see the male as the leader and the female as the follower in such groups.52 Even Daly, when discussing
a woman convicted of dealing drugs in what was apparently a family operation, does not challenge the presumption, reflected in their
sentences, that the family's teenage son was the main operator; yet
she indicates that the mother's role could not be determined (p.
155).
The effect on the sentence imposed of a prior relationship between victim and defendant is ~omewhat more complex. As Daly
indicates, it usually serves to lessen the perceived seriousness of the
crime - what is sometimes referred to as. the "domestic discount."53 Given existing patterns of criminality, the effect is that
crimes by women, though also crimes against women, will be judged
less severely. The latter effect has led many feminists working on
domestic violence issues to deem this factor illegitimate.54 Daly, at
one point, seems to accept the validity of this factor - she deems
women's robberies less serious in part because the women "know[]
their victims" (p. 107). At another point, she highlights the complex character of the victim-offender relationship: "When women
harm adults they know, their acts can be perceived as more serious
if they betray vulnerable victims, or as less serious when the victims
are not credible" (p. 122).
One often can recharacterize a prior relationship between victim and offender as indicative of a blurred boundary between offender and victim status. When it is unclear which of the parties to
an encounter is really the victim, the,sentence is appropriately less.
This is most apparent in those crimes of interpersonal violence in
which the defendant, though not legally justified, acted against
someone who had previously victimized him or her (pp. 129-30).
Similar ambiguities may arise when a woman robs someone she
knows. "[D]id she set the victim up, or did her accomplice take
advantage of a situation? If the former is true, a woman's robbery
might be viewed as more serious because a trust has been trans52. The most extreme form of this presumption is the ancient rule presuming that a wife
who committed a crime acted under the coercion of her husband. See generally ROLLIN M.
PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 1018-27 {3d ed. 1982).
53. The effect is clearest in the situation of interpersonal violence. The criminal law traditionally has viewed assaults between intimates as "private" and thus outside its scope. See,
e.g., Lawrence W. Sherman, The Influence of Criminology on Criminal Law: Evaluating Arrests for Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 83 J. CruM. L. & CruMINoLOGY 1, 11 (1992); Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem,
Forging the Solutions, in FEMINIST JurusPRUDENCE 188, 197-99 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993).
The discount applies even to homicide: "Our law reveals a disposition to regard killing a
stranger for gain as more heinous than killing a spouse or child in anger." Rapaport, supra
note 44, at 378.
·
54. See, e.g., ANN JoNES, Nmcr TIME SHE'LL BE DEAD: BA1TERY AND How TO STOP IT
18-24 (1994); Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who
Kil~ 2 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 76-77 (1992).
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gressed. If the latter, the woman's role may be cast in a less serious
light" (p. 103), as a somewhat-willing accomplice of the man who
exploits her access to the victim.
Whether the defendant's crime is a response to earlier behavior
by the victim and thus mitigated is not easy to determine, however.
Moreover, our gendered expectations may color our perceptions of
how readily men and women resort to ~iolence. Daly recognizes
this ambiguity. "Previous research ... prepares us to see women's
acts as spawned by victimized circumstances, and thus as less heinous and more defensible than men's. And perhaps they are. "55
Other factors, too, seem both gendered in some complex way
and explanatory of sentencing. For example, Daly notes that several of the women expressed remorse during the sentencing colloquies, but almost no men did (pp. 180, 201 ). Remorse would seem
appropriate to consider as ari aspect of blameworthiness. The difference may reflect genuine, gendered differences in the willingness
to accept responsibility for one's harmful acts.56 It may, however,
result from the fact that women "are better able to negotiate their
subordinated, deviant status with state officials than are minority
group men, who more often contest their deviant status and thus
seem recalcitrant."57
It seems appropriate to consider factors such as remorse in sentencing, even if they are gendered. It is clearly unjust and creates
unwarranted disparities, however, if the gender link is an artifact of
the way we see defendantS through our gendered preconceptions.
Yet, even with effort and commitment, it is extraordinarily difficult
not to view defendants as men and women. Daly eloquently describes the problem:
I found myself seeing more self-defensive elements in the women's
violence, filling in gender asymmetries in physical strength and threats
of violence. Only after several readings could I see the self-defensive
elements in the men's acts. These were buried in the narrative, as in
55. P. 126. That "perhaps" sums up the dilemma of both what we know and what we
should do based on Daly's findings. If women are indeed different in ways relevant to just
sentencing, then gender disparities are acceptable-. If women are merely seen, for example,
as quasi-victims because of gender stereotyping, then gender disparities suggest a need for
reform. While in any single case we might be able to choose accurately between reality or
stereotype, at the level of generality on which policy must be made, they are hopelessly
entangled.
56. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol
Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REv. 1 (1990) (discussing women's greater
recognition of human interconnectedness).
57. P. 264. There is a rich developing literature on the issues of race, class, and gender
and their effect on subordinated people's ability and willingness to present themselves to the
legal system in ways that that system will recognize and reward. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri,
Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Leaming Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J.
2107 (1991); White, supra note 38.
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Earl's case, where I initially overlooked the victim's coming at him
with a pair of scissors." [p. 131; emphasis added]

Daly encourages us consciously to look for patterns that challenge
our gender stereotypes. We can scarcely hope, however, to eliminate stereotyping in the way we - or judges - see the world.
This epistemological dilemma goes hand-in-hand with a political
dilemma. Even insofar as gendered differences on relevant criteria
are "real," it may nonetheless be inappropriate to take them into
account, perhaps precisely because they are so thoroughly
gendered. If a defendant's behavior is the produet of deeply
gendered socialization and expectations, is it ·fully subject to our
moral condemnation? As Daly recognizes, her book, in part, recapitulates long-standing and perhaps irresolvable debates in feminist
theory and politics over the sources of gender differences and the
appropriate legal response to real differences, whether biological or
socially constructed - what is sometimes loosely referred to as the
"sameness-difference" dilemma.5 8 The Daly book gives extra
poignancy to the debate by shifting it to a context in which the
women most directly affected - women defendants - seem generally to benefit from the application of gendered criteria.59
III.

WIDER IMPLICATIONS

The relationship between gender and punishment is one in
which the gendered differences, however deep and pervasive, do
not generally seem to be biological or essential. Perhaps, then, the
dilemma here does have a reasonably satisfactory solution. Decisionmakers should take into account the ways in which women appear to be deserving of lesser punishments, but they should do
everything possible to ensure that men also benefit from the acknowledgment of these apparently gendered and relevant criteria.
In the remainder of this review, I want to explore the implications,
in a variety of criminal justice settings, of using gendered criteria in
this manner. In effect, I propose replacing both traditional an58. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Social Construction, Roving Biologism, and Reasonable
Women: A Response to Professor Epstein, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 1021 (1992); Joan C. Williams,
Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modem Path Beyond Essentialism in
Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DuKE L.J. 296; Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 325 (1984-85).
59. Cf., e.g., Mary Coombs, Agency and Partnership: A Study of Breach of Promise Plaintiffs, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (1989) (discussing the historical value of breach of marriage
actions to "traditional" women); Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call
My Good Nature 'Deceit"': A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 374
(1993) (discussing the benefit for certain vulnerable women of a cause of action for
seduction).
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drocentric criminology and gender neutrality with Daly's womannormed approach.60
Let us consider the difference a woman-normed approach might
make in three interrelated contexts: existing sentencing practices,
the study of the sources of crime, and the public policy debates over
sentencing. In each, context, the gender ratio problem - the fact
that the vast majority of criminals are men - is a necessary background fact, but not the focus of our approach. Rather, we must
consider the question of discrimination: Does the field treat similarly situated men and women equally? If it does not, is there some
explanation, consistent with genuine knowledge or just outcomes,
for the difference? Equality as such is not the goal. Rather, justice
as equality may require the acceptance of apparent discrimination
in criminological studies and penological practice insofar as it reflects real and relevant differences in men's and women's lives.61

A. Sentencing Practices
Perhaps the best example of the way in which a woman-normed
approach allows us better to understand the use of a gender-related
factor in sentencing involves a {actor only touched on in this book
- family status. As Daly pointed out in two earlier works, judges
frequently practice "familial patemalism."62 Criminals seen as having substantial responsibilities for families are given lighter
sentences; that group is predominantly female.63 In cases in which
the defendant has no perceived familial responsibilities, paternalism
disappears, and men and women receive similar sentences.64
Taking familial responsibilities into account is consistent with
general sentencing principles of assessing the consequences of a
sentence for the defendant and others.65 Thus far, it would seem
60. By woman-normed, I mean beginning our analysis with women, but extending the
study to men as well so that the insights gained by studying female criminals can be applied,
as appropriate, to males as well. Such a process serves to disrupt the androcentrism that
inattention to gender creates.
61. See MARY EATON, JusnCE FOR WoMEN? 11 (1986). Daly quotes Blumstein and his
coauthors that discrimination only exists when an illegitimate factor like race or sex is associated with case outcomes after controlling adequately for all relevant variables. P. 237; emphasis added (citing RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM, supra note 12,
at 72-73). The heart of the problem, of course, is when and whether factors associated with
such illegitimate criteria as race and sex are nonetheless relevant and worth the cost in apparent discrimination.
62. Daly, Rethinking Judicial Paternalism, supra note 20, at 9; Kathleen Daly, Structure
and Practice of Familial-Based Justice in a Criminal Court, 21 L. & SoCY. REV. 267, 268
(1987) [hereinafter Daly, Structure and Practice].
63. Daly, Rethinking Judicial Paternalism, supra note 20, at 27; Daly, Structure and Practice, supra note 62, at 282.
64. Daly, Rethinking Judicial Paternalism, supra note 20, at 18.
65. Cf. CARLEN, supra note 18, at 63 (stating that magistrates are reluctant to jail
mothers, in part because of the effect on their children).
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that we have explained much of apparent gender discrimination in
sentencing by a nonproblematic, relevant variable. As Parisi argues, if women in fact do most of the child care, the courts should
take this into account and not blindly impose "equal treatment for
parents, defined simply by genetic reproduction." 66 But we must
consider both whether the factor, as applied, truly is relevant to just
sentencing and whether inappropriately gendered perceptions distort its application.
First, even when judges see men's family responsibilities, they
do not always treat them as seriously as women's family responsibilities. Judges do not con~ider breadwinnin,g -. .the traditional male
contribution to the family - to be as impor~ant to the maintenance
of the family as child care.67 While this disparate treatment is presumptively discriminatory in effect, it may nonetheless be defensible. For example, one might conclude that, from the children's
perspective, replacing the father's income with welfare is less traumatic than replacing the mother's caregiving with a stranger as foster parent.68 For men, though not, apparently, for women,
perceived family responsibilities are correlated with class. A whitecollar defendant's contribution to his family has more positive effect than those contributions of other male defendants.69
Moreover, the gendered differences in familial responsibilities
may sometimes be perceived rather than real. Women are seen
fundamentally as familied and judged according to their success in
that role. This would suggest that women who are perceived as bad
parents are punished for it in a way that men are not.70 Men, on the
other hand, are not seen primarily as fathers, and thus courts may
fail to see when a man is familied. 71
These gendered perceptions create potential injustices in the application of familial paternalism in sentencing. If family responsi66. Parisi, supra note 19, at 216; cf. Smith, supra note 6, at 601 (noting that
"[i]ncarceration appears to wreak greater destructive consequences upon inmate mothers
than upon inmate fathers . . . . [I]ncarcerated mothers, as opposed to fathers, rarely have the
option of leaving their children with the other parent for caretaking").
67. Daly, Structure and Practice, supra note 62, at 279. When men have "mother-like"
domestic responsibilities, however, they also receive lenient sentence recommendations. EATON, supra note 61, at 63.
·
68. See infra text accompanying notes 97-100 (discussing Sentencing Guidelines).
69. See Daly, Structure and Practice, supra note 62, at 280.
70. See EATON, supra note 61, at 61; cf. ANNE WORRALL, OFFENDING WOMEN 31 (1990).
Daly, however, concludes that this was not a significant problem in her sample. "Such
women are rendered deviant more by their previous and current lawbreaking and less so by
how they care for children." P. 197.
Further, though theory might suggest that unfamilied women would be punished more
severely than unfamilied men, Daly's study indicates that unfamilied men and unfamilied
women are in fact treated equally. See Daly, Structure and Practice, supra note 62.
71. Daly, Structure and Practice, supra note 62, at 279 (It can be "difficult .•. to persuade
the court that familied men do care for their children").
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bilities are genuinely part of the calculus of harm, blameworthiness,
and consequence, however, it would be unjust to ignore them
merely because they create the opportunity for gender discrimination. The injustice of ignoring these concerns, furthermore, would
disproportionately fall on women. Instead, analysts and decisionmakers should use woman-based norms in dealing with familial
status. Having observed the importance of this factor by studying
women offenders, we should seek to see it and take it into account
in the lives of both men and women.
Men and women also differ, or are seen to differ, in the extent
to which they are ambiguously victim or offender. This blurring of
boundaries can occur in the context of the particular criminal event
and can mitigate punishment. There may also be elements of victimization, such as childhood abuse, in the defendant's history,
which partially explain the sources of the defendant's criminal behavior and thus reduce his or her blameworthiness. Both broadly
and narrowly framed, blurred boundaries seem more typical of female defendants. Those who have studied street women have
noted ways in which survival strategies for women who have fled
abuse become the basis for criminalization.72 Scholars who have
focused on female offenders have recognized and made visible
these linkages between abuse and criminality.73
Daly leads us beyond the rejection of androcentrism to a
deeper, woman-normed analysis of victimization and offending. By
putting women first, we see victimization. But victimization exists
for men as well. Daly's typology of women's pathways to criminal
court includes "harmed and harming women" (pp. 51-54). She then
discovers male biographies that fit the pattern of "harmed and
harming men" (pp. 71-73). She finds at least one case of a male
defendant who acted in the kind of imperfect self-defense generally
associated with female defendants.74
Although blurred boundaries exist for some male defendants,
others in the criminal justice system are less likely to notice them.
The men's defense attorneys rarely sought to describe their clients
as victims or pawns (p. · 201 ), and even Daly herself noted the
greater difficulty in recognizing self-defense elements in their stories (p. 131). By putting women's stories first, we may make it eas72. Gilfus, supra note 18, at 65.
73. Chesney-Lind, supra note 20, at 11.
74. P. 129. Shane, a model high school student who responded to threats by gang members, was perceived as the victim by the judge and received a suspended sentence for shooting and injuring one of the gang members. Shane's case is clearly unusual. What is unclear is
whether it is the self-defense element or the ability of others to perceive it that distinguishes
his case from those of all the other men. The system was less sympathetic when a male
sought to assist his friend who was being attacked because the attackers in that case were
police officers. P. 136.
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ier to see the elements of victimization in men's offenses and in
men's biographies. Feminism has revealed the significance of familial abuse in the development of women offenders. Male felons' biographies may include similar physical and sexual abuse within the
family.75 Eyes sensitized by studying women first may also more
readily perceive the variant forms of abuse that occur within the
negative environments men must navigate as men. These are most
visible in the biographies· Daly labels "excesses of masculinity."76
"More such links [between victimization and criminalization] could
be made for the men if the sites of the masculinist domination of
boys and men [in male peer group practices and juvenile and adult
institutions] were recognized" (p. 260). Given that crime is
predominantly a male occupation, the criminological enterprise
needs to examine these criminogenic aspects of men's lives.77
B. Roots of Lawbreaking
Daly's book is predominantly about gender and punishment. It
suggests, however, the value that a parallel woman-~ormed project
might have for a study of gender and lawbreaking. Criminology's
study of criminals, like its study of criminal justice systems, has traditionally been unconsciously androcentric. That is, it has taken
men as its subject but obscured the significance of their gender.78
One scholar noted, "Men as males have never been the object of
the criminological gaze."79 More recently some scholars, most no75. See, e.g., Cathy Spatz Widom, Child Abuse, Neglect, and Violent Criminal Behavior,
27 CRIMINOLOGY 251 (1989) (finding that both men and women who had suffered abuse as
children had more extensive criminal records as adults).
76. P. 259. One thought inspired by Daly's method suggests a fruitful area for research.
Men who live in certain urban ghettos are likely to spend time in prison. They may adopt a
persona of extreme violence, aggression, and dominance - what Daly calls the "excesses of
masculinity" biography - in response to prison conditions or in preparation for the prison
time they see in their future. The alternative, given prison conditions, is to be at serious risk
of being raped, of being another man's "woman." The excesses of masculinity ~iography
may reflect an effect of such treatment or a preemptive response to the possibility of such
treatment in prison. Jack Katz's hard men may have sensible reason to be so perceived by
their future fellow inmates. See JACK KATZ, SEoucnoNs OF CRIME (1988).
77. Hilary Allen highlights the costs of excluding the factors used to understand female
felons from an analysis of male criminology:
If anything, one might argue that there is greater oppression in the general exclusion of
such considerations from the deliberations concerning males - who may also be subject
to personal frailties, family pressures and external disadvantages, even though in male
cases the prevailing images of criminality make it more difficult for such factors to be
acceptably or effectively emphasized.
Hilary Allen, supra note 42, at 81, 93.
78. See Daly & Chesney-Lind, supra note 12, at 508 (discussing traditional criminology's
failure to explicate either the generalizability problem - that purportedly general explanations of crime do not work for women - or the gender ratio problem).
79. Maureen Cain, Towards Transgression: New Directions in Feminist Criminology, 18
INTL. J. Soc. OF L. 1, 11 (1990).
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tably Jack Katz, have recognized the maleness of male criminals.Bo
But these explanations are limited in their own terms and almost
useless in understanding female offenders.Bl The explanation is almost tautological: "[M]en commit crimes because crime is masculine and women do not because crime is masculine." 82
A woman-normed appi:oach may provide a tool for understanding why crime is predominantly a male activity without making the
study of women criminals a mere sidelight to "real" criminology.B3
It is too early to predict what such a woman-normed criminology
might look like, though it is likely that the requisite methodology
will, like Daly's book, involve a blend of logico-science and narrative methodologies.84
One example of a woman-normed approach to criminology
draws upon the work of John Braithwaite.B5 Braithwaite suggests
that people are less likely to commit crimes if they are integrated
into networks in which noncriminal behavior is expected and deviations are subject to a shaming that maintains bonds of respect and
concern. Women, because of family structures, are more likely to
remain in such networks, moving from family of origin to family of
affiliation.B6 Men, who more often move away into living situations
less characterized by sharing a household with those for whom they
feel responsible or who feel responsible for them, are less constrained by these informal social controls. The theory, beginning
with an insight about women as well as men, responds to the gender
ratio problem. It also allows for generalizations across the gender
divide. It predicts that those women who are less embedded in

80. KATZ, supra note 76. For example, Katz explains male robbers as extending a particular version of being male through doing a stickup. Id. at 238.
81. See Nancy C. Jurik & Peter Gregware, A Method for Murder: The Study of Homicides by Women, in 4 PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 179 (Gale Miller & James A.
Holstein eds., 1992) (arguing that the theory of homicide as a strategy for impression management is of limited usefulness in explaining female homicides).
82. Allen, supra note 15, at 28-29.

83. See Cain, supra note 79, at 11; Carol Smart, Feminist Approaches to Criminology or
Postmodern Woman Meets Atavistic Man, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN CruMINOLOOY 70, 78
(Loraine Gelsthorpe & Allison Morris eds., 1990). By studying both men and women, we
can begin to answer the question "what it is about men ... as men that induces them to
commit crimes." Allen, supra note 15, at 36 (quoting Elizabeth Grosz, Feminism and Social
Theory (Oct. 30, 1987) (unpublished manuscript, presented to the Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of Queensland)).
84. Daly, together with Chesney-Lind, laid out a blueprint for such future research.
"[W]e think that the most pressing need today is ••. to get our hands dirty, and to plunge
more deeply into the social worlds of girls and women. The same holds true for boys and
men..•• " Daly & Chesney-Lind, supra note 12, at 519.

85. BRATIHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME
86. Id. at 92.

AND

REINTEGRATION (1989).
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these reintegrative networks will be more likely to commit crimes,
and this is borne out by Braithwaite's data and that of others.87
If Braithwaite is correct, women are far more likely to be embedded in reintegrative networks, but this difference is not linked to
anything essentially true about men or women. The task of criminology as social policy, then, is to reverse Professor Higgins' famous
question in My Fair Lady88 and ask: "Why can't a man can be more
like a woman?" There is, of course, the risk that Braithwaite's theory, if used as a basis for sentencing policy, may be read as more
essentially gendered than the facts of the cases would warrant.
Women will be seen as subject to informal social controls and thus
in less need of punishment even when they are not; men will be
seen as anomic and socially isolated even when they are not. A
variant of this perceptual problem may lie behind the differing assessment Daly's judges make of male and female defendants' relationships: "[W]here girlfriends or future wives were mentioned, the
women are typically assumed to be positive forces for the men's
reformation ... [but] boyfriends or husbands were assumed to be
negative forces, leading them toward lawbreaking" (pp. 216-17).
The judges may usually be right, but they are likely to be overgeneralizing. Such stereotypes unfairly disadvantage female defendants because they make it difficult to see that some male companions may provide a positive force toward law-abidingness.
These stereotypes also disadvantage gay and lesbian defendants because they may be unwilling even to reveal the existence of companions who might provide such a reintegrative community and, if
they did so, the judges would be less likely to see the positive aspects of such relationships.s9
C. Criminal Justice Policymaking
A woman-normed approach may also provide better policy guidance for criminal justice issues than either traditional androcentrism or prescriptions·for formal gender equality. When women are
incarcerated, for example, the conditions under which they live are
often radically different than those in men's prisons. Women's demands for better treatment articulated as discrimination claims
sometimes succeed.9° But these claims are a classic form of acfrl. Id.; RAFraR, supra note 16; Gilfus, supra note 18, at 70; Coramae Richey Mann, Race
and Sentencing of Female Felons: A Field Study, 7 INTL. J. WoMEN's STUD. 160, 164-65
(1984).
88. ALAN J. LERNER & FREDRICK LoEWE, MY FAffi. LADY.
89. Cf. Bottoms v. Bottoms, No. 94-1166, 1995 WL 234222, at *7 (Va. Apr. 21, 1995)
(finding lesbian mother unfit in part because child will be exposed to the "social condemnation" attached to a lesbian household).
90. See, e.g., West v. Virginia Dept. of Corrections, 847 F; Supp. 402 (W.D. Va. 1994);
McCoy v. Nevada Dept. of Prisons, 776 F. Supp. 521 (D. Nev. 1991); Bukhari v. Hutto, 4fr7 F.
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cepting the male model, even when it is inapt.91 Women are disadvantaged by having fewer vocational training programs than male
inmates.92 They are also disadvantaged by lack of attention to their
own needs, such as effective access to their children.93 Furthermore, if we examine the needs of women inmates, we may learn
something about how to treat male inmates, some of whom might
also benefit from ·policies that encourage and facilitate continued
contact with family and intimates. .
The advantages of putting women first are even clearer in examining sentencing policies. Family paternalism allows judges to consider the defendant's role in her or his family; recognition of
blurred boundaries allows the judge to assess fully the defendant's
blameworthiness in general or in the particular encounter. Judges
most readily perceive these factors when the defendant is female.
They have, however, sometimes applied them to the benefit of men
who are quasi-victims or familied. A sentencing jurisprudence that
encouraged judges to articulate the reasons underlying their decisions would facilitate the development and clarification of the relevance of such facts to the harm-blameworthiness-consequences
metric, reducing both discrimination and disparity.94
Increasingly, however, jurisdictions are adopting sentencing
guidelines.95 These guidelines consistently and properly reject the
relevance of gender to their formula.9 6 Most go further, however.
They reject the relevance of numerous criteria, such as family responsibilities, that judges have traditionally taken into account, criteria that disproportionately benefited women.97 In effect - if not
by design - these guidelines harm women.9s They would seem to
Supp. 1162 (E.D. Va 1980). But see Klinger v. Dept. of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727 (8th Cir.
1994).
91. For example, women inmates might want training in jobs equally likely to allow them
to be self-supporting, but not the same training to be auto mechanics or appliance repairers
that the best men's prisons provide, given the obstacles to women in those occupations.
"Women are once again an afterthought in a correctional process that is again punitive rather
than corrective." Meda Chesney-Lind, Patriarchy and Prisons: A Critical Look at Trends in
Women's Incarceration, in PROCEEDINGS OF TiiE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WOMEN,
LAw AND SOCIAL CoNTRoL 17 (Marie-Andree Bertran et al. eds., 1992).
92. See Merry Morash et al., A Comparison of Programming for Women and Men in U.S.
Prisons in the 1980s, 40 CRIME & DEUNQ. 197 (1994).
93. Daly & Chesney-Lind, supra note 12, at 525.
94. See WHEELER ET AL., supra note 28, at 25.
95. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(l) (1988); Kay A. Knapp, State and Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Apples and Oranges, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 679, 679 (1992).
96. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 5Hl.10; FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 921.001(4)(a)(l) (Harrison Supp.
1994).
97. See U.S.S.G. § 5Hl.6 ("Family ties and responsibilities ..• are not ordinarily relevant
in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range.");
Raeder, supra note 6, at 906.
98. See, e.g., REsEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM, supra note 12, at
213-14 {describing the effect of the California sentencing guidelines); cf. WHEELER ET AL.,
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forbid judges from considering the consequences of sentencing a
Mattie Lou Thomas to prison and leaving her dependent children
and grandchild without a caretaker. If we both begin with women's
lives and recognize that the drafters of these guidelines did not do
so, we may be more willing to read creatively and find room to take
into account such gendered factors as "extraordinary family circumstances."99 Such a reading will benefit women but not only women.
If men are - and can successfully present themselves, as - extraordinarily responsible for families, they too should be able to call
for leniency.100
In a variety of contexts, then, Daly's woman-normed approach
is more promising than either the unconscious androcentrism of
traditional criminology or the simplistic formal gender equality of
many sentencing guidelines.101 At a minimum, both scholarship
and policy prescriptions should assess on their own merits the significance of factors associated with gender. Having decided that,
for example, judges should justly consider a biography characterized by victimization, we should work to ensure that such history is
\noticed and considered when it appears in the biographies of both
female and male offenders. This approach is not free of the risks of
reaffirming gender ideologies.102 As Daly self-reflectively points
out, "As readers and observers of personal violence, we fill in the
gaps in stories of harm. There is a readiness to see women as less
culpable than men for their acts, or at least, to see women'~ acts as
supra note 28, at 184, 187 n.26 (noting the elimination of life history factors in the Minnesota
and federal guidelines).
99. United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 128-29 (2d Cir. 1992); cf. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0
(authorizing departures from applicable Guideline sentences for "unusual ci,rcumstances").
100. This call for a return to a more contextual sentencing policy, sensitive to offenders'
life histories may be, at least in the short run, spitting in the wind. The current politics of
crime seems to require dehumanizing all offenders, recategorizing them as "criminals" who
are different from us and who deserve only to be locked away forever. Consider the increased move toward mandatory minimum sentences and, more recently, "three strikes and
you're out." See Chesney-Lind, supra note 91, at 16 (discussing effect of minimum
mandatory sentencing on women offenders); Stephen Labaton, President Urges Law Officers
to Press for an Anticrime Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.12, 1994, at A14 (discussing the meaning of
the "three-strikes-and-out" rule).
101. The ultimate example, hopefully ironic, of a formal equality approach may be the
statement that "women are deprived of their rightful place in the masculine setting of the ,
prison, just as they have been deprived of their rightful place in the male-dominated world of
business executives." DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., CRlMEs OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES: WHITECoLLAR OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL CoURTS 145 n.18 (1991).
102. See, e.g., WoRRALL, supra note 70. As Hilary Allen notes, the images of women as
less culpable are often conceptually contrary to women's interests, but "in relation to the
particular women concerned, the avoidance or reduction of punitive sanctions cannot easily
be seen as anything but advantageous." Allen, supra note 42, at 92. Daly makes a related
point regarding the recognition of women's role in the family: "If such arguments affirm a
woman's labor for others and may serve to mitigate incarceration, then how is it that women
suffer gender subordination?" P. 263.
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more likely to have arisen from experiences of victimization."103
Such risks are unavoidable, however, unless we insist on the greater
injustice of ignoring all factors that correlate with gender. A
woman-normed approach minimizes the risk of such injustices and
allocates them in a way that most benefits women, while holding
out hope of also recognizing the harms suffered by men. In a world
of imperfect choices, it is surely one worth trying.

103. P. 133. The danger we must most guard against is the potential harm to black male
defendants. Given both the prejudices of criminal justice personnel and the swaggering or
sullen style such defendants may self-protectively adopt, it may be especially difficult to see
the elements of victimization or the availability of reintegrative networks in their life stories.
See generally Symposium, Criminal Law, Criminal Justice, and Race, 67 Tur.. L. REv. 1725
(1993) (discussing relationship between race and criminal justice).

